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JUVENILE LAW-DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975)
In Breed v. Jones' the United States Supreme
Court held that the prosecution of a juvenile as an
adult in criminal court after an adjudicatory proceed-
ing in juvenile court2 violates the double jeopardy
1421 U.S. 519 (1975).
'Through the passage of juvenile court acts, juvenile
courts have been established in every state in the Union, the
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 14 (1967). The first juvenile court in the country
was opened in Chicago in 1899, and " . . . soon, like the
prairie fires of the first decade of this century, the juvenile
court movement swept over America." Ketcham, Legal
Renaissance in the Juvenile Court, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 585,
586 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Ketcham].
The child in trouble was an object of special concern for
nineteenth-century American social reformers. Thejuvenile
offender was regarded as a tragic victim, innocently caught
in the vortex of clashing social forces beyond his control:
industrialization, mass immigration, and rapid urbaniza-
tion. As Justice Fortas observed in Gault, the reformers
"were profoundly convinced that society's duty to the child
could not be confined by the concept of justice alone." 387
U.S. at 15. Reform efforts began with the drive to create
separate institutional facilities for juveniles, progressed to
the development of the juvenile court system, and cul-
minated in the alteration of "the very philosophy underly-
ing judicial handling of children." PRESIDENT'S COMMsIS-
SION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
AND YOUTH CRIME 3 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK
FORCE REPORT].
Under the common law no differentiation was made
between the adult accused of committing a crime and a
minor who had reached the age of criminal responsibility,
which in some states was as low as the age of seven. Mack,
The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 106 (1909).
The child would simply be prosecuted exactly like an adult
under the criminal law: if he were found guilty, he would be
punished. As one of the leaders of the juvenile court
movement declared:
[The state] did not aim to find out what the accused's
history was, what his heredity, his environments, his
associations; it did not ask how he had come to do the
particular act which had brought him before the
court.
Id. at 107.
The origin of the juvenile court idea has been traced to
the English chancery courts, which, in the name of the
King, traditionally exercised protective jurisdiction over the
interests of all children throughout the realm-particularly
of their real property interests. This came to be known as
the doctrine of parens patriae. When transplanted to
America, the chancery courts were additionally regarded as
the special protectors of neglected and abandoned children.
Thus it was that the reformers could envision the state as
clause of the fifth amendment, 3 as applied to the
states through the fourteenth amendment.
4
On February 9, 1971, the state of California filed a
petition in the County of Los Angeles Juvenile Court
beneficently reaching out by means of a special court to
rescue children in trouble. Behind the juvenile system was
the thought that the child who has begun to go wrong,
who is incorrigible, who has broken a law or an or-
dinance, is to be taken in hand by the state, not as an
enemy but as a protector, as the ultimate guardian, be-
cause either the unwillingness or inability of the na-
tural parents to guide it toward good citizenship has
compelled the intervention of the public authori-
ties....
Id. at 107. By casting the juvenile court as the inheritor of
the benevolent tradition of parenspatriae the constitutional
question raised by the juvenile system was neatly foreclosed.
Unlike an adult, the child had no right to liberty, but rather
a right to protective and nurturing custody. If the parents
were unable to provide this custody it was the duty of the
state to step in to provide "the 'custody' to which the child is
entitled." 387 U.S. at 17. Even though the children brought
before them may have committed criminal acts, juvenile
courts were not criminal courts, and thus the criminal
justice safeguards of the Constitution were both inapplica-
ble and unnecessary. An almost evangelically fervent
defense of this view is found in Commonwealth v. Fisher,
213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905):
[The Juvenile Court Act] is not for the punishment of
offenders but for the salvation of children ... whose
salvation may become the duty of the state .... No
child ... is excluded from its beneficent provisions.
Its protecting arm is for all ... who may need its pro-
tection.
To save a child from becoming a criminal, or from
continuing in a career of crime ... the Legislature
surely may provide for the salvation of such a child
... by bringing it into one of the courts of the state
without any process at all, for the purpose of subject-
ing it to the State's guardianship and protection....
[Tihe State, when compelled as parens patriae, to
take the place of the father ... [is not] required to
adopt any process as a means of placing its hand upon
the child to lead it into one of its courts. When the
child gets there, and the court, with the power to save
it, determines on its salvation, and not its punishment,
it is immaterial how it got there.
213 Pa. 50, 53, 62 A. 199, 200.
Juvenile proceedings differed from criminal proceedings
in a number of ways. First, a new vocabulary was applied
to the processes of the court, primarily to avoid the stigma of
criminal prosecution. The terms of the new system were as
follows:
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alleging that respondent, then seventeen years old,
had committed an act which, if committed by an
adult, would constitute the crime of robbery in
violation of Cal. Penal Code § 211. Following a
detention hearing the next day, 5 respondent was
ordered detained pending an adjudicatory hearing on
the delinquency petition.
On March 1 this second hearing was held in
accordance with Cal. Welf. & Inst'ns Code § 701 6
Petition instead of complaint, summons instead of war-
rant, initial hearing instead of arraignment, finding of
involvement instead of conviction, disposition instead
of sentence ...
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra, at 3. Also, juvenile sessions
were conducted in less formal physical surroundings. But
more fundamental was a thorough-going re-ordering of
basic goals and purposes.
The goals were to investigAte, diagnose, and prescribe
treatment, not to adjudicate guilt or fix blame. The in-
dividual's background was more important than the
facts of a given incident, specific conduct relevant more
as symptomatic of a need for the court to bring its help-
ing powers to bear than as prerequisite to exercise of
jurisdiction. Lawyers were unnecessary-adversary
tactics were out of place, for the mutual aim of all was
not to contest or object but to determine the treatment
plan best for the child. That plan was to be devised by
the increasingly popular psychologists and psychi-
atrists; delinquency was thought of almost as a disease
to be diagnosed by specialists and the patient kindly
but firmly dosed.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra, at 3. In the vivid words of
a leading recent juvenile court judge:
In the exuberant belief that court-ordered social serv-
ice was the answer to all the ills of youth, law was for-
gotten and lawyers were summarily dismissed from
the hallowed halls of the children's court to assure that
salvation, lilac scent and the social-work supervisor
would reign supreme.
Ketcham, supra, at 586.
3 ... nor shall any person be subject for the same of-
fence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.. . " U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
'The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment was
applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (overruling
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)).
5Respondent was represented by court-appointed coun-
sel at this hearing and in all subsequent proceedings. At the
detention hearing the probation officer was required to
present a prima facie ease that respondent had indeed
committed the offense alleged in the petition.
'When petition for certiorari was filed with the United
States Supreme Court, CAL. WELt. & INST'NS CODE § 701
(West 1966) provided:
At the hearing, the court shall first consider only the
question whether the minor is a person described by
Sections 600, 601, or 602, and for this purpose, any
matter or information relevant and material to the cir-
cumstances or acts which are alleged to bring him
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is admissi-
ble and may be received in evidence; however, a pre-
for the purpose of determining whether respondent
had committed the crime alleged, whether the juve-
nile court had jurisdiction of the matter, 7 and whether
respondent should be declared a ward of the juvenile
court. Following testimony taken from two prosecu-
tion witnesses and from respondent, the Court
sustained the delinquency petition, finding that
respondent had committed the robbery and was
within thejurisdiction of thejuvenile court. Pursuant
to Cal. Welf. & Inst'ns Code § 702 the proceedings
ponderance of evidence, legally admissible in the trial
of criminal cases, must be adduced to support a finding
that the minor is a person described by Section 602,
and a preponderance f evidence, legally admissible
in the trial of civil cases must be adduced to support a
finding that the minor is @.,person described by Sec-
tions 600 or 601. When it appears that the minor had
made an extrajudicial admission or confession and
denies the same at the hearing, the court may continue
the hearing for not to exceed seven days to enable the
probation officer to subpoena witnesses to attend the
hearing to prove the allegations of the petition. If the
minor is not represented by counsel at the hearing, it
shall be deemed that objections that could have been
made to the evidence were made.
'Should the allegations be true the juvenile court would
have jurisdiction pursuant to CAL. WELF. & INST'NS
CODE § 602.
At the time, CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 602 (West
1966) provided:
Any person under the age of 21 years who violates
any law of this State or of the United States or any or-
dinance of any city or county of this State defining
crime or who, after having been found by the juvenile
court to be a person described by Section 601, fails to
obey any lawful order of the juvenile court, is within
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may ad-
judge such person to be a ward of the court.
'At the time, CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 702
(West 1966) provided:
After hearing such evidence, the court shall make a
finding, noted in the minutes of the court, whether or
not the minor is a person described by Sections 600,
601 or 602. If it finds that the minor is not such a per-
son, it shall order that the petition be dismissed and
the minor be discharged from any detention or restric-
tion theretofore ordered. If the court finds that the
minor is such a person, it shall make and enter its
findings and order accordingly and shall then proceed
to hear evidence on the question of the proper disposi-
tion to be made of the minor. Prior to doing so, it may
continue the hearing, if necessary, to receive the so-
cial study of the probation officer or to receive other
evidence on its own motion or the motion of a parent
or guardian for not to exceed 10 judicial days if the
minor is detained during such continuance, and if the
minor is not detained, it may continue the hearing to a
date not later than 30 days after the date of filing of the
petition. The court may, for good cause shown con-
tinue the hearing for an additional 15 days, if the mi-
nor is not detained. The court may make such order
for detention of the minor or his release from deten-
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were continued for a dispositional hearing and
respondent was ordered to remain in detention until
that time.
At the subsequent hearing on March 15 the
juvenile court judge announced his intention to find
respondent not amenable to rehabilitation as a
juvenile and to order that respondent be tried as an
adult in criminal court. When respondent's counsel
objected on the grounds that he had not expected this
to be a fitness hearing, a one-week continuance was
granted, during which counsel raised the claim that a
transfer to criminal court following adjudication as a
juvenile would put respondent in double jeopardy.
One week later the court ruled respondent was unfit
for treatment as a juvenile under Cal. Welf. and
Instn's Code § 707 9 and ordered that he be prose-
tion, during the period of the continuance, as is appro-
priate.
'At the time, CAL. WEL. & INST'NS CODE § 707
(West 1966) provided:
At any time during a hearing upon a petition alleging
that a minor is, by reason of violation of any criminal
statute or ordinance, a person described in Section
602, when substantial evidence has been adduced to
support a finding that the minor was 16 years of age
or older at the time of the alleged commission of such
offense and that the minor would not be amenable to
the care, treatment and training program available
through the facilities of the juvenile court, or if, at any
time after such hearing, a minor who was 16 years of
age or older at the time of the commission of an offense
and who was committed therefor by the court to the
Youth Authority, is returned to the court by the Youth
Authority pursuant to Section 780 or 1737.1, the court
may make a finding noted in the minutes of the court
that the minor is not a fit and proper subject to be dealt
with under this chapter, and the court shall direct the
district attorney or other appropriate prosecuting offi-
cer to prosecute the person under the applicable crimi-
nal statute or ordinance and thereafter dismiss the
petition or, if a prosecution has been commenced in
another court but has been suspended while juvenile
court proceedings are held, shall dismiss the petition
and issue its order directing that the other court pro-
ceedings resume.
In determining whether the minor is a fit and
proper subject to be dealt with under this chapter, the
offense, in itself, shall not be sufficient to support a
finding that such minor is not a fit and proper subject
to be 'dealt with under the provisions of the Juvenile
Court Law.
A denial by the person on whose behalf the petition
is brought of any or all of the facts or conclusions set
forth therein or of any inference to be drawn therefrom
is not, of itself, sufficient to support a finding that such
person is not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with
under the provisions of the Juvenile Court Law.
The court shall cause the probation officer to inves-
tigate and submit a report on the behavioral patterns
of the person being considered for unfitness.
cuted as an adult. In so doing the court signalled its
implicit rejection of the double jeopardy argument.
Respondent's attempts to obtain habeas corpus
relief in the state courts met with no success. 1
Subsequently, an information was filed in superior
court accusing respondent of having committed
armed robbery. He entered a plea of not guilty and
again raised the claim of double jeopardy, arguing
that he had already been found guilty in juvenile
court of the offense charged in the information.
Nevertheless, respondent was found guilty and the
double jeopardy argument was again rejected.
Following his conviction respondent filed a peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California,
alleging that the transfer to adult court and subse-
quent trial there constituted double jeopardy. The
petition was denied by the district court" on the
grounds that juvenile proceedings were "civil rather
than criminal in nature '"" s and a juvenile court
1In re Gary Steven J., 17 Cal. App. 3d 704, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 185 (1971), cert. denied by California Supreme Court
August 4, 1971. SeeJones v. Breed, 343 F. Supp. 690, 691
n.2 (C.D. Cal. 1972). Respondent made two contentions
in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus at the state level.
First, he maintained that as a matter of statutory construc-
tion the transfer order under section 707, supra note 9,
must be made during the pendency of the section 701
hearing, supra note 6, and that once the section 701 hear-
ing was completed, the statutory power to transfer a ju-
venile to adult court had lapsed. The court held that this
construction ran "counter to... the whole philosophy of
the present juvenile court law" and "would violate both
the letter and the spirit of the statute" which sought to
guarantee fairness by having separate hearings for deten-
tion and disposition. 17 Cal. App. 3d at 708, 95 Cal. Rptr.
at 188. The purpose of requiring separate hearings was
to prevent the court from being prejudiced "by evidence
of the minor's character not relevant to determination of
his guilt." 17 Cal. App. 3d at 708, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
Second, respondent claimed a constitutional right to
protection against double jeopardy which prevented trans-
fer to criminal court once his section 701 hearing had
begun. The court refuted this claim by relying on the con-
cept of continuing jeopardy. See note 38 infra. A second
jeopardy did not attach when respondent was transferred
to adult court because no final disposition had been
reached in his case.
"Jones v. Breed, 343 F. Supp. 690 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
"In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966),
the Court observed:
Because the State is supposed to proceed in respect of
the child asparenspatriae and not as adversary, courts
have relied on the premise that the proceedings are
"civil" in nature and not criminal, and have asserted
that the child cannot complain of the deprivation of
important rights available in criminal cases.
Sve also Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41
MINN. L. REv. 547 (1957).
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would be "[deprived] of its ability to function" 13 if it
had to follow the same "formal and technical rules as
to when jeopardy attaches or terminates" 4 as apply
to adult criminal proceedings. Furthermore, even if it
were assumed that jeopardy had attached during the
juvenile proceedings, the district court held no new
jeopardy would have arisen out of the transfer to
criminal court. Since transfer constituted neither
acquittal nor conviction, respondent was in "contin-
uing jeopardy" at the adult level. 15
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that the double jeopardy clause of
the fifth amendment is fully applicable to juvenile
court proceedings. 6 The court held that jeopardy
attached at the adjudicatory hearing, the point at
which the juvenile court could "impose severe re-
strictions upon the juvenile's liberty."" 1 The court of
appeals concluded that application of the double
jeopardy guarantee to juvenile courts would not
impair "their basic goal of rehabilitating the erring
youth."' 8
The United States Supreme Court, in a unani-
mous opinion delivered by Chief Justice Burger,
upheld the opinion of the court of appeals. 19
1343 F. Supp. at 692. The court suggests that the
legislature established juvenile courts to function in a
manner different from the criminal justice system. The
legislature had established a "comprehensive program...
for the handling of delinquent youth," and there were many
"distinctions between the preliminary procedures and
hearings provided by California law for juveniles" and
those for the criminal prosecution of adults. 343 F. Supp. at
691-92.
141d. at 692. The court described these rules as "rigid
and inflexible," 343 F. Supp. at 692, and seemed to imply
they would have a destructive effect upon the unique ends
sought to be achieved within the juvenile system. However,
the only specific "end" of the juvenile system to which the
court made any reference in its brief opinion was that of
allowing "a minor accused of a crime a means to escape
some of the consequences which would result to an adult
offender." Id. at 692.
15 1d.
"Jones v. Breed, 497 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1974).
"Id. at 1165.
18Id.
"The court of appeals had originally ordered the
district court to issue a writ of habeas corpus, directing the
state court within sixty days to vacate respondent's adult
conviction and either set him free or remand him to juvenile
court. This order had been stayed while the Supreme
Court's decision was pending. Since respondent was over
eighteen years of age when the decision was announced, he
was no longer under the jurisdiction of the California
juvenile court system. The Court thus vacated the judgment
of the court of appeals and remanded the case "for such
further proceedings consistent with this opinion as may be
appropriate in the circumstances." 421 U.S. at 541.
At the outset the Court recognized three points of
agreement shared by the parties to the case. First, as
a defendant to the armed robbery information after
his transfer to the criminal court, respondent received
the full protection of the double jeopardy clause of
the fifth amendment. 2 Second, respondent was
definitely placed in jeopardy by the proceedings on
the robbery information. Third, both the delin-
quency petition filed in juvenile court and the
robbery information filed in superior court stemmed
from the same offense. The sole question before the
Court was whether the prior proceedings at the
juvenile court level placed the respondent in double
jeopardy when he stood trial as an adult in criminal
court.
The Supreme Court first reiterated that jeopardy
denotes risk, the sort of risk "traditionally associated
with a criminal prosecution.""' Although the double
jeopardy clause had been interpreted more broadly
than its literal "jeopardy of life and limb" wording,
it has been given application only to proceedings that
are "essentially criminal '"2 2 in nature.
"See note 4 supra.
2 421 U.S. at 528. See Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S.
377 (1975) (defendant charged with willfully failing to
report for and submit to induction into the armed forces;
held, double jeopardy clause does not bar an appeal by the
government from a pretrial order dismissing an indict-
ment); Wilson v. United States, 420 U.S. 332 (1975)
(defendant charged with crime of converting union funds to
his own use; held, without contravening the double jeop-
ardy clause, the government may appeal from ruling of
trial judge in favor of defendant after a guilty verdict has
been entered by trier of fact); United States v. Jorn, 400
U.S. 470 (1971) (appellee charged with willfully assisting
in the preparation of fraudulent income tax return; held,
double jeopardy clause bars government appeal of an order
dismissing an information when retrial was presented to a
second jury, the original jury having been discharged after
the mistrial); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970) (where
defendant tried for murder was found guilty of lesser
included offense of voluntary manslaughter and conviction
reversed on appeal, double jeopardy clause bars retrial on
murder charge; return of verdict on lesser charge carried
with it implicit acquittal on murder charge; Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957) (jeopardy for first
degree murder terminated when the jury was discharged at
end of first trial where defendant had been found guilty of
lesser included offense of second degree murder); United
States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896) (acquittal on charge of
murder; held, even where indictment defective, sufficient to
bar subsequent prosecution for same offense).
"Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) (double
jeopardy clause does not bar assessment of 50 per cent
penalty following an acquittal of a charge of willful attempt
to evade income tax; since penalty was not assessed for
criminal purposes, assessment was not an essentially crimi-




In discussing its recent juvenile justice decisions,
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,2 3 In re Winship," In re
Gault, 25 and Kent v. United States,26 the Court
acknowledged that the ideals and aspirations of the
juvenile court system have in reality fallen sadly
short of fulfillment. 27 As a result of this disparity the
Court has extended to the juvenile system a number
of constitutional protections associated with criminal
prosecutions.28 This line of decisions has brought
about so significant a "constitutional
domestication" ' 29 of the juvenile court system that it
is no longer possible to declare, as the district court
had in denying respondent's habeas petition, that
juvenile proceedings were "civil rather than criminal
in nature.""0 The Court found no adequate grounds
upon which to distinguish respondent's adjudicatory
hearing in juvenile court from an adult criminal
prosecution. The consequence of each was the same:
incarceration for the purpose of enforcing the crimi-
nal laws. " And the fact that one was ostensibly for
rehabilitative purposes and the other for punitive
purposes was not controlling since loss of liberty
against one's will resulted from either proceeding. 12
Such an end result engenders the very risk that the
term "jeopardy" has come to denote.
23403 U.S. 528 (1971). See notes 51-57 and accompany-
ing text infra.
24397 U.S. 358 (1970). See notes 48-50 and accompany-
ing text infra.
2t387 U.S. 1 (1967). See notes 48-50 and accompany-
ing text infra.
26383 U.S. 541 (1966).
2 In describing the shortcomings of the juvenile court
system, the Court in Gault, McKeiver, and again in Breed
made reference to the TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2.
The Commission concluded:
In theory, the juvenile court was to be helpful and re-
habilitative rather than punitive. In fact the distinction
often disappears, not only because of the absence of
facilities and personnel but also because of the limits of
knowledge and technique...
In theory, the court's operations could justifiably be
informal, its findings and decisions made without ob-
serving ordinary procedural safeguards, because it
would act only in the best interest of the child. In fact
it frequently does nothing more nor less than deprive
a child of liberty without due process of law-knowing
not what else to do and needing, whether admittedly
or not, to act in the community's interest even more
imperatively than the child's.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9.
28 See notes 48-58 infra.
29387 U.S. at 22.
11343 F. Supp. at 692. Indeed Gault specifically requires
courts to shun "the 'civil' label-of-convenience which has
been attached to juvenile proceedings." 387 U.S. at 50.
31400 U.S. at 479.
11387 U.S. at 50. See Fain v. Duff, 488 F.2d 218, 225
(5th Cir. 1973).
Petitioner's argument centered on the contention
that even if jeopardy were conceded to have attached
at the adjudicatory hearing, the transfer to criminal
court did not subject respondent to double jeopardy.
Two lines of analysis were extended to support this
claim, both of which the Court rejected.
First, petitioner claimed transfer "violated none of
the policies of the Double Jeopardy Clause" because
respondent was not subjected to double punishment
for a single offense."2 The Court relied on its line of
double jeopardy decisions to refute this argument.34
It is not only double punishment which the clause
serves to prevent, but also the "potential or risk of
trial and conviction." 2 9 The Court also cited to the
"policy of avoiding multiple trials," a policy to
which exceptions "have been only grudgingly
allowed." 36 Although only punished once, respond-
ent suffered the "heavy personal strain" 37 which
follows from being twice put through the ordeal of
trial.
Second, petitioner sought to support his claim on
the basis of the concept of "continuing jeopardy," 8
by analogizing to those cases where a second trial is
permitted if proceedings against a defendant have not
13421 U.S. at 532.
"United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975); United
States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971); Price v. Georgia. 398
U.S. 323 (1970); United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 579 (1824).
3'398 U.S. at 329 (emphasis added by Chief Justice
Burger). The double jeopardy clause had been held by the
Supreme Court to prevent multiple punishments, Ex parte
Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873); reprosecution
following conviction, In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889);
reprosecution after acquittal, Fong Foo v. United States,
369 U.S. 141 (1962); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S.
100 (1904); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896); and
reprosecution following premature termination of a trial in
certain circumstances, United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470
(1971); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
36420 U.S. at 343.
11400 U.S. at 479. In Green v. United States the Court
succinctly described the sort of personal strain it is the
purpose of the double jeopardy clause to prevent:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at
least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is
that the State with all its resources and power should
not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting
him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and com-
pelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility
that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
355 U.S. at 187-88.
38 A certain amount of confusion seems to surround the
use of the term "continuing jeopardy"-confusion which
arises in part, as the Court noted, because the term refers to
both "a concept and a conclusion." 421 U.S. at 534. Justice
Holmes first used the term in his dissent in Kepner v.
[Vol. 66
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come to a full resolution."9 The Court rejected the
view that respondent was not placed in double
jeopardy simply because the proceedings against him
had not run their full course at the time of his
transfer to adult court. If the double jeopardy clause
is to be abridged in cases where a juvenile is
transferred to adult court following juvenile court
adjudication, it must be because of a "manifest
necessity." 40 Either the societal interests expressed in
the provision of a special juvenile court structure, or
the needs of the juvenile himself would have to
"render tolerable the costs and burdens . . . which
the exception will entail in individual cases." 4'
Petitioner argued that implementing double jeop-
ardy protection in the juvenile courts would destroy
the unique flexibility of the juvenile system-a
system structured to meet the needs of juvenile
offenders in a more individualized and informal
context than was possible within the framework of a
criminal prosecution. Not all juveniles, however, are
amenable to such treatment, and in recognition of
this fact, the great majority of jurisdictions have
provided procedures for transfer to adult court.42
While acknowledging that the resources of the
United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904), to describe his view
that "a man cannot be said to be more than once in jeop-
ardy in the same cause, however often he may be tried"
because jeopardy continues from the "beginning to the end
of the cause." 195 U.S. at 134. This view has never
commanded a majority of the Supreme Court, but it has
come to be known as the concept of continuing jeopardy, in
contradistinction to the policy which the Court has adopted
inJorn, Green, Price, and the majority holding in Kepner.
The phrase "continuing jeopardy" has also been used to
explain why an accused who has had his conviction reversed
on appeal can again be tried.
Most courts regarded the new trial as a second jeop-
ardy but justified this on the ground that the appellant
had "waived" his plea of former jeopardy by asking
that the conviction be set aside. Other courts viewed
the second trial as continuing the same jeopardy which
hpd attached at the first trial by reasoning that jeop-
ardy did not come to an end until the accused was
acquitted or his conviction became final. But whatever
the rationalization, this Court has also held that a de-
fendant can be tried a second time for an offense when
his prior conviction for that same offense had been set
aside on appeal.
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. at 189. Today, how-
ever, this conclusion can be more satisfactorily justified
on the basis of the interests involved respectively by society
and by the accused. Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. at 329 n 4.
3
9 Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973); United
States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971); Downum v. United
States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
"United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580
(1824).
41421 U.S. at 535.
41 See generally Rudstein, Double Jeopardy in Juvenile
juvenile court system are already severely strained,
the Court nonetheless rejected petitioner's contention
that the system would be overborne by the applica-
tion of the double jeopardy guarantee. Requiring
transfer decisions to be made prior to adjudicatory
hearings would not create any substantial difficulties
for the nation's juvenile courts, and the Court
observed there was no evidence that juvenile courts
could not function effectively in those jurisdictions
where such a procedure was already utilized. The
nature of the juvenile court proceeding would not be
altered although some duplication of evidence may
arise in cases where transfer is considered and then
rejected. Once transfer is recommended in a particu-
lar case, proceedings cease at the juvenile level,
offsetting, in part, any increase that might be
generated by cases where transfer is not recom-
mended.
In the final analysis, the Court concluded that
"transfer hearings prior to adjudication" would
actually "aid the objectives" of the juvenile court
system.' 3 Where transfer was possible after juv-
enile court adjudication, a youthful offender was
faced with a difficult dilemma. By fully cooperating
with juvenile authorities he might prejudice his case
if transfer to adult court were ordered. If he ap-
peared reluctant to cooperate and transfer was re-
jected, he risked "adverse adjudication, as well as...
an unfavorable dispositional recommendation" at the
juvenile level."" Such a dilemma cast the juvenile and
his attorney "into a posture of adversary wariness"
fundamentally at odds with "the potential for infor-
mality and cooperation which was intended to be the
hallmark of the juvenile court system." 45 The Court
thus concluded that neither the interest of society in
extending a special system of procedures and treat-
ment for juveniles nor the interest of the individual
juvenile offender would be best served by abridge-
ment of the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy.
Breed v. Jones is a consistent application of the
analytical structure developed by the Supreme Court
in its earlier juvenile justice holdings to the narrow
question of whether juveniles transferred to stand
trial in adult criminal prosecutions after an adjudi-
cation proceeding in juvenile court are subjected to
double jeopardy. The Court had voiced a far-ranging
dissatisfaction with the juvenile court system in In re
Proceedings, 14 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 266, 297 n.128
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Rudstein].





Gault."' Rather than summarily imposing all the
Constitution's guarantees upon the juvenile system,
the Court has continued to recognize the validity of a
separate method of treatment for juvenile offenders.
Instead the Court has proceeded on a case-by-case
determination of the applicability of individual con-
stitutional safeguards to juvenile proceedings. Justice
Fortas in Gault specifically and emphatically de-
clared that the Court was not concerned with "the
impact of these constitutional provisions upon the
totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the
state.''
4
From Gault, Winship, and McKeiver it can be
seen that the Court's analysis focuses on two funda-
mental questions: (1) What is the nature of the
constitutional right involved; and (2) Will the appli-
cation of that right negatively affect the unique
aspects of the juvenile court system?' 8 On the basis of
this analysis, the Court extended four due process
guarantees in Gault: the rights to notice, counsel,
and confrontation of witnesses, and the privilege
against self-incrimination. In Winship, following the
same rationale, the Court held that juvenile criminal
offenders were constitutionally entitled to a standard
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In both cases the
rights involved had previously been held to apply to
the states through the fourteenth amendment, 9 and
were deemed fundamental to any proceeding where a
person, whether a child or adult, stood to lose his
6
Juvenile Court history has . . . demonstrated that
unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is
frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure.
• ..The absence of substantive standards has not necessar-
ily meant that children receive careful, compassionate,
individualized treatment. The absence of procedural rules
based upon constitutional principle has not always pro-
duced fair, efficient and effective procedures. Departures
from established principles of due process have frequently
resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness.
387 U.S. at 18-19 See generally TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 2.
4 387 U.S. at 13.48 In Gault the Court also considered two secondary
criteria: (1) whether national studies, commentators, or
proposed model acts had recommended a given constitu-
tional right be implemented within the juvenile court
system, and (2) the number of jurisdictions currently
extending the right to the juvenile courts.
4'Adequate notice was held to be a requirement of due
process in state criminal proceedings in In re Oliver, 333
U.S. 257 (1948) and Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196
(1948). The right to counsel in criminal proceedings was
applied to the states in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); the
right to confrontation and cross-examination in Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965) and Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965); and the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
liberty for a number of years. Such proceedings
against juveniles were found to be "comparable in
seriousness to a felony prosecution" against an
adult. '0
Regarding the effect upon the juvenile system of
the implementation of the four constitutional rights
deemed fundamental in Gault, the majority declaredf
that
the observance of due process standards... will
not compel the States to abandon or displace any of the
substantive benefits of the juvenile process....
[T]he features of the juvenile system which its pro-
ponents have asserted are of unique benefit will not
be impaired by constitutional domestication. 1
Similarly, in Winship the majority found that the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
would not have any deleterious effects upon the
beneficial provisions of juvenile court
proceedings-flexibility and informality would still
prevail.
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania the Court declined
to hold that jury trials were constitutionally man-
dated in the juvenile courts. McKeiver has been seen
as constituting a departure from the philosophy and
also the rationale of Gault and Winship. 52 Although
the analysis parallels that of Gault and Winship, "
Justice Blackmun, speaking for a four-justice plural-
ity, placed special emphasis upon the necessity for
constitutional guarantees relating to factfinding
procedures in juvenile courts. A jury trial was not
considered "a necessary component of accurate
factfinding" "' and the plurality cited to several types
of cases where juries are not required, " and to
5 5In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366 (1970), citing In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).
51387 U.S. at 21-22.
"2See Rudstein, supra note 42, at 273; Note, Juvenile
Court: Due Process, Double Jeopardy, and the Florida
Waiver Procedures, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 300, 302 n.26
(1974). See also the reliance placed by district court upon
McKeiver to deny application of double jeopardy clause to
respondent. 343 F. Supp. at 692.
5 3Justice Blackmun also utilized the two secondary
criteria discussed in Gault. See note 48 supra. When
confronted with the issue "the great majority of States" had
concluded that jury trials were not mandatory in juvenile
courts under the rationales of Gault and Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 403 U.S. at 549. Also the
National Conference of Commissioners on State Uniform
Laws, the National Council on Crime' and Delinquency,
and the HEW Children's Bureau had stopped short of
recommending jury trials in their respective proposals for
model statutes. Id. at 549-50.
11403 U.S. at 543.
5 5E.g., military trials, cases in equity, probate, deporta-
tion, and workmen's compensation cases. Id. at 543. Here
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statements in Duncan v. Louisiana" to the effect that
a jury is "not a necessary part of every criminal
process that is fair and equitable." 5 The right to
trial by jury was not considered as fundamental
as those applied to juvenile courts in Gault and
Winship. Furthermore, imposing that right onto the
juvenile system would "provide an attrition of the
juvenile court's assumed ability to function in a
unique manner." 58 Delay, increased formality, de-
struction of the juvenile court's historic confidential-
ity, and the advent of adversary proceedings were
raised as probable results. The plurality combined
this negative impact upon the informal, flexible and
individualized elements of the juvenile system with
the fact that trial by jury was not a constitutional
right applicable to all criminal proceedings against
adults, and declined to extend jury trials to the
juvenile system:
If the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process
are to be superimposed upon the juvenile court system,
there is little need for its separate existence. Perhaps
that ultimate disillusionment will come one day, but
for the moment we are disinclined to give impetus to
it.59
In Breed v. Jones the Court made no reference to
the narrower view that only constitutional safeguards
relating to the factfinding process have a place in the
juvenile system."0 This unanimous holding may
the plurality can be seen as leaning upon a very slender
reed-military trials do not arise under the Constitution,
and the remaining examples cited are not criminal proceed-
ings.
"Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
11403 U.S. at 547. See also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. at 149-50 n.14, 158. In Duncan the Court struck
down a provision of the Louisiana constitution which
allowed for trial by jury only in capital cases or for offenses
punishable by hard labor. The fourteenth amendment was
held to guarantee a right to trial by jury in all cases which
would come within the sixth amendment if tried in federal
court. In determining whether a crime is a serious one
subject to the sixth amendment, the penalty authorized for a
particular crime was found to be a factor of major relevance.
18403 U.S. at 547.
"Id. at 551.
"At least one court has viewed the double jeopardy
clause as advancing the quality and efficiency of the
factfinding process itself. State v. Halverson, 192 N.W.2d
765 (Iowa 1971). By eliminating the possibility of two trials
for the same offense, it is argued that double jeopardy
protection assures that all factual information will be
gathered prior to the time of the transfer hearing. Sufficient
investigation will be conducted by the state prior to a
transfer hearing to determine whether a juvenile is amena-
ble to the treatment and services of the juvenile court.
[Ihf a county attorney is causing juvenile cases to be
investigated properly ... he will know in advance
indeed imply a rejection of the limited standard
embraced by the McKeiver plurality and a reaffirma-
tion of the more inclusive standard of Gault and
Winship.
Breed v. Jones is significant in showing that
McKeiver did not signal the halt of the Court's
extension of constitutional guarantees to the juvenile
court system. It is another step in the Court's chosen
process of case-by-case determination. Breed is a
continuation of the two-pronged analysis followed in
the earlier decisions. First, the protection against
double jeopardy is not merely a "[formality] of the
criminal adjudicative process" but a fundamental
protection extended to all essentially criminal
proceedings.6" And, where the consequences of a
delinquency proceeding approach in seriousness
those of a criminal prosecution, the risk involved is
one to which the term "jeopardy" ascribes. Second,
the Court has been able to arrive at a procedural
accommodation between the application of the dou-
ble jeopardy clause and the unique aspects of the
juvenile court system by requiring transfer proceed-
ings to take place prior to adjudication. The nature
of juvenile court hearings will not be disrupted here
as they would have been by the imposition of jury
trials. Any impact of Breed v. Jones will fall
principally upon the dockets and caseloads of the
juvenile courts, and although the Court did not
anticipate this burden to be great, it is nevertheless
one that must be absorbed under a constitutional
system.
The Court's test as developed in these decisions
seeks to balance the substantive benefits of individu-
alized justice for juvenile offenders with the degree to
which a given constitutional right is deemed to be
fundamental. In the view of a persistent majority of
the Court since Gault, both elements must be
considered in determining whether a particular right
is constitutionally required in the juvenile court
system.
The negative portent of McKeiver has been greatly
diminished by the Court's willingness to extend an
additional constitutional right to juveniles in Breed v.
Jones. However, in view of the contrasting conclu-
sions reached in these two cases, a careful examina-
tion of the Court's test is necessary before projecting
whether juvenile offenders may be extended addi-
whether he desires to prosecute criminally and he can
so move the court at or before the outset of the hearing.
He has available the investigative facilities of the pro-
bation officer, the law enforcement officers, and the
social services staff.
192 N.W.2d at 769.
61403 U.S. at 551.
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tional constitutional protections in future cases. Both
elements of the Court's analysis contain troublesome
ambiguities that can significantly affect the ultimate
decision.
First, the threshold for determining whether a
given right merits application to the juvenile system
is whether that right has been held to apply to state
criminal prosecutions through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment." 2 But moie is re-
quired: the right must also be "fundamental" in its
application-it must' be required in all criminal
proceedings. It is doubtful whether any valid criteria
can be established to determine whether some consti-
tutional guarantees are more "fundamental" than
others, but McKeiver signifies that this additional
refinement can be a powerful determinative. On the
basis of strained analogies,"3 a plurality of the Court
in McKeiver concluded that the right to jury trial
was not fundamental, even though only four years
before the right to trial by jury had been held to be
constitutionally required in state criminal proceed-
ings. This extra scrutiny to determine "fundamental-
ity" can permit the Court to maneuver within a given
characterization. McKeiver stands as a warning that
the Court's analysis allows for the drawing of highly
refined distinctions concerning the nature of constitu-
tional rights. Such distinctions may serve in a future
case to again justify the withholding from the
juvenile system of a given constitutional guarantee.
Second, the Court has not been sufficiently clear in
defining just what it is about the juvenile court
system that so manifestly deserves preservation. The
test is framed in terms of whether a given constitu-
tional right would have a negative effect upon the
informal, flexible and unique qualities of the
juvenile court system. 64 These are very generalized
criteria by which to measure the applicability of
constitutional rights, and at the present time the
Court appears to have developed two different
narrowing interpretations.
The Court's broad references to informality and
flexibility may lead to the inference that it is seeking
to keep the juvenile court as free as possible from the
constraints of procedural formalities. To this end,
constitutional rights which increase formality may be
denied to juveniles, especially if the rights can also be
found to be non-fundamental. Concern for the
preservation of procedural informality is strongly
apparent in McKeiver:
62See notes 4, 49, 57 supra.
"5See note 55 supra.
64421 U.S. at 535; 403 U.S. at 547.
If the jury trial were to be injected into the juvenile
court system as a matter of right, it would bring
with it into that system the traditional delay, the
formality, and the clamor of the adversary sys-
tem. .... 11
The alternative interpretation emphasizes preserv-
ing the flexibility necessary for the juvenile court to
deal responsively with the needs of each juvenile
offender as an individual human being. Breed v.
Jones reveals a significant concern on the part of the
Court for the personal rights and welfare of the
individual offender.
Thus, in terms of potential consequences, there is little
to distinguish an adjudicatory hearing such as was
held in this case from a traditional criminal prosecu-
tion. For that reason, it engenders elements of "anxi-
ety and insecurity" in ajuvenile, and imposes a "heavy
personal strain." 66
Hopefully, an observation made by the Court in
Breed will limit the possibility of future decisions
seeking to withhold constitutional rights to juveniles
out of deference to a desire to maintain procedural
informality within the juvenile court system:
That the flexibility and informality of juvenile pro-
ceedings are diminished by the application of due
process standards is not open to doubt. Due process
standards inevitably produce such an effect, but that
tells us no more than that the Constitution imposes
burdens on the functioning of government and espe-
cially of law enforcement institutions.67
For the present, however, it must be recognized that
in considering whether a given right should be held
constitutionally required in the juvenile courts, the
Court's analysis has allowed for emphasis to be
selectively placed upon either the needs of the system,
as in McKeiver, or upon the rights of the individual
offender. 6"
65403 U.S. at 550.
66421 U.S. at 530-31.
67421 U.S. at 535-36n.15.
6 Other constitutional safeguards may yet be applied to
the juvenile court system under the Gault- Winship-Breed
analysis. Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex.
1974), a case having potentially profound implications for
the entire juvenile justice system, was decided in the fall of
1974 by a federal district court in Texas. The court ordered
that two detention institutions operated by the Texas Youth
Council be closed because confinement in them amounted to
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth
amendment. The court relied upon the right to treatment
argument developed in Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d
507 (5th Cir. 1974) vacated, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), in hold-
ing that
the juvenile must be given treatment lest the involun-
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In summary, Breed v. Jones holds that ajuvenile is
unconstitutionally subjected to double jeopardy if he
is transferred to stand trial as an adult following
tary commitment amount to an arbitrary exercise of
governmental power proscribed by the due process
clause.
383 F. Supp. at 71.
The exhaustive opinion of the court was based upon the
testimony of several renowned penologists and also of
children who had experienced confinement in the two
facilities in question. With meticulous detail, Judge Justice
examined the practices of these institutions, where the staff
spoke only of attaining "control," yet where violence
among the inmates met with little resistance from staff
personnel. The court concluded that the state was not
carefully seeking to match children to appropriate treat-
ment methods, but was instead incarcerating many children
whose case histories did not indicate a need for institutional-
ization.
Under the Supreme Court's analysis a strong case can be
made for extending the protection against cruel and unusual
punishment to the juvenile court system. First, the Court
has recognized that this constitutional protection applies to
the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972);
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947). In the words of Justice
Brennan, "the values and ideals [the cruel and unusual
punishments clause] embodies are basic to our scheme of
government." 408 U.S. at 258. Second, the Morales
opinion catalogues horrors and deprivations utterly inimi-
cal to the goals and purposes which a non-punitive,
treatment-oriented system should be seeking to attain:
Practices found by this court to violate the eighth
amendment were: the widespread practice of beating,
slapping, kicking, and otherwise physically abusing
juveniles in the absence of any exigent circumstances
... the use of tear gas and other chemical crowd-con-
trol devices in situations not posing an imminent
threat to human life or an imminent and substantial
threat to property; the placing of juveniles in solitary
confinement or other secured facilities, in the absence
of any legislative or administrative limitation on the
duration and intensity of the confinement and subject
only to the unfettered discretion of correctional offi-
cers; the requirement that inmates maintain silence
during periods of the day merely for the purpose of
punishment; and the performance of repetitive, non-
functional, and degrading tasks. Included as such tasks
... were: requiring a juvenile to pull grass without
bending his knees on a large tract of ground not in-
tended for cultivation or any other purpose; forcing
him to move dirt with a shovel from one place on the
ground to another and then back again many times;
and making him buff a small area of the floor for a
period of time exceeding that in which any reasona-
ble person would conclude that the floor was suffi-
ciently buffed.
383 F. Supp. at 77.
A finding by the Supreme Court that incarcerating
children in detention facilities where such practices were
tolerated amounted to cruel and unusual punishment could
have a truly revolutionary impact upon the entire juvenile
adjudication for the same offense in juvenile court. 69
The double jeopardy clause was found applicable to
the transfer decision because protection against dou-
court system. Constitutional compulsion may perhaps be
the only effective way in which to secure the commitment of
resources necessary for the truly humane treatment of
juvenile offenders. As Judge Justice declared in Morales:
The state may not circumvent the Constitution by sim-
ply refusing to create any alternatives to incarceration;
it must act affirmatively to foster such alternatives as
now exist only in rudimentary form (foster homes,
supervised probation and parole), and to build new
programs suited to the needs of the hundreds of its
children that do not need institutional care... The
Constitution of the United States and the laws of the
State of Texas require no less ....
383 F. Supp. at 125.
Several other criminal procedures guaranteed to adults,
however, may never be extended to the juvenile court
system. The constitutional right to a public trial under the
sixth amendment is too contrary to the raison d'&tre of the
juvenile system to withstand the test developed in Gault,
Winship, and Breed. Although it may be argued that public
trials would expose questionable procedures to community
scrutiny, private hearings and confidential records serve a
primarily protective purpose in juvenile proceedings. They
seek to spare the child from the harmful glare of publicity
that could jeopardize both the effectiveness of his rehabilita-
tive treatment as well as his entire future.
The fourth amendment protections against illegal
searches and seizures may in time be-dxtended to the
juvenile court system. The exclusionary rule found by the
Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), to
be a constitutionally-required rule of criminal procedure,
may never be applied to juveniles-but not, however,
because of any incompatability between it and the basic
objectives of the juvenile system. During the October 1975
term the Court will decide a case which directly challenges
the conclusion of the Mapp Court that, in order to deter
police misconduct, the fourth amendment requires the
exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the laws of search
and seizure. Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1975),
cert. granted, 422 U.S. 1055 (1975). Some modification of
the Mapp rule may well be forthcoming. As attested by
his vigorous dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of-Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 417
(1971), the ChiefJustice strongly opposes the continuation
of a constitutionally-required exclusionary rule. Justice
Blackmun expressed similar views by joining in a con-
curring opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971). And in a recent case the Court explicity ques-
tioned the validity of suppression as a sanction where the
police have not acted in bad faith. Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 447 (1974).
6 The facts in Breed did not present the question of
whether the double jeopardy clause prohibits a second
delinquency petition in juvenile court following an original
adjudication that ends in a dismissal of the charges. Under
the Court's rationale, however, the same result would
follow in this situation. Where a child is faced with a
substantial deprivation of liberty, he cannot constitutionally
be subjected to the ordeal of a second proceeding on the
same offense in juvenile court once the original charges
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ble jeopardy is essential in any proceeding where an
individual stands to lose his personal liberty for the
purpose of enforcing the criminal law. Breed v. Jones
represents another step in the Supreme Court's
process of applying the criminal procedural guaran-
tees of the Constitution to the juvenile court system.
The Court continues to acknowledge that the juve-
against him have been dismissed. The state courts which
had faced this issue following Gault had unanimously
concluded that fundamental fairness standards barred a
second juvenile proceeding. See Rudstein, supra note 42, at
279.
nile system has not lived up to its early idealistic
potential. Simultaneously, however, the Court con-
tinues to support the theoretical validity of a separate
mode of flexible and individualized procedure for
youthful offenders. This is shown by the Court's
decision to extend constitutional guarantees solely on
the basis of case-by-case determinations, and even
then, only after an analysis has shown that the right
in question is indeed fundamental in nature and that
its application will not have a deleterious effect upon
those beneficial accomplishments which the juvenile
system can still produce.
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